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This special issue is a collection of articles whose authors explore different forms 
of populism in countries located beyond the Western core and therefore much less known 
to specialists in the field. The country-based case studies selected for this issue reflect 
diversity of populist forces in non-central polities in Europe. Each of them has a rich 
legacy of conflicts and controversies with major European powers, which serves as one of 
powerful sources of contemporary populist discourses, pushing many of them towards 
national reassertion and EU-skepticism.  
The articles collected in this issue cover a variety of aspects of populist politics. 
Olga Lavrinenko speaks about ‘technocratic populism’ in Hungary and Czech Republic, 
Alexandra Yatsyk addresses ‘biopolitical populism’ in Poland, Ionut Chiruta explores 
memory-based populism in Romania, Michael Cole and Silas Marker engage 
ideologically explicit forms of populism, with strong nationalist and ethno-religious 
connotations, in (correspondingly) Georgia and Denmark, and Aliaksei Kazharski with 
Andrey Makarychev analyze performative populism in Slovakia and Estonia. 
Lavrinenko’s article on technocratic populism represents a particularly tough 
challenge to the habitual categorizations of populist narratives as an expressive and 
emotive opposition to post-political / administrative / managerial policy making. In her 
study she argues that populism has colonized the whole political spectrum and does not 
respect the traditional left-right or liberal conservative divides. This assumption is also 
shared by Kazharski and Makarychev who conclude that in Estonia and Slovakia populist 
methods of gaining public visibility in the media and performatively addressing ‘the 
people’ are spread all across the entire political spectrum. The inscription of populist 
approaches and narratives into administrative and managerial logics blurs the line 
between populism and technocracy. By the same token, a conceptualization of populism 
as an “economic project” grounded in a certain type of expertise and knowledge opens 
new avenues for – perhaps paradoxically - examining populism from a Foucault-inspired 
governmentality perspective. The variety of social, cultural and political spheres where 
populism exposes itself as a discourse shaper may lead us to presume that populism is a 
better fit to characterize what Michel Foucault dubbed capillary micro-policy practices, 
rather than regimes, parties or moreover countries. In other words, it is specific practices 
– such as memorialization of certain historical events, or marginalization of particular 
groups (immigrants or sexual minorities) – that make policy steps or measures populist. 
Of particular interest in this regard are ‘populist parties’ in governments, since they impel 
a hybrid form of politics: on the one hand, these parties stick with populist narratives, yet 
on the other hand their members are decision makers and have to show expertise in 
budgetary and financial issues, national defense and other spheres of governance.  
This nuanced contextualization may help avoid undue overgeneralizations, and 
also may contribute to developing a post-foundational approach to populism, which 
interestingly resonates with analysis of populism as a phenomenon of post-socialist / 
post-communist transformations. In this sense, the plethora of populist discourses that 
most of Western polities had to discover and face only in the recent decade, was inscribed 
much earlier into mainstream politics in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. For 
example, Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s rampant populism in Belarus seems to be a deeply 
post-Soviet phenomenon, as are the roots of the Georgian and Ukrainian versions of 
populism. Likewise, each case of mass-scale public mobilization against populist elites in 
Eastern Europe in recent years, ‘colour revolutions’ included, involved the activation of a 
performatively populist style. 
This allows us to assume that populism is a transgressive political phenomenon 
that disregards ideological borders and often aims to bring together, under a singly 
performative style, groups and individuals with very diverse political preferences and 
sympathies. Both illiberal populism and populist resistance to it blend and synthesize 
various ideologies: there might be pro-capitalist and anti-capitalist constituencies among 
Vladimir Putin’s (in Russia) or Volodymyr Zelensky’s (in Ukraine) supporters, as well as 
the Maidan revolution of 2013-2014 or the anti-Lukashenka protests in Belarus in 2020 
might embrace both cosmopolitan liberals and cultural nationalists.   
 One of the least researched areas in populism studies is transfer of policy practices 
/ experiences from one polity to another. Michael Cole, for example, notes that Georgian 
right-wing populism has been to some extent inspired and ignited by the conservative 
wave in the West. Undoubtedly, Donald Trump or Marine Le Pen could serve as attractive 
reference figures for like-minded politicians beyond the Western core, although the scale 
and the scope of spill-over effects of this sort should not be overrated. Matteo Salvini’s 
attempts to create a sort of “conservative international” so far didn’t materialize, and 
National Rally’s public contacts with their sympathizers in, for instance, Baltic states 
remain quite limited and sporadic. The same goes, by the way, for German right-wing 
populists from AfD who internationally are much more in demand in Moscow than 
elsewhere in the post-Warsaw-Pact countries. Even less appealing to countries like 
Georgia, Poland, Estonia or Slovakia is the Russian version of what Alexandra Yatsyk 
terms ‘biopolitical conservatism’.   
The Covid-19 emergency has undoubtedly opened a new space for populist politics, 
and elucidated the ability of illiberal populism to make direct connections between 
different events – such as the refugee crisis and the outburst of the pandemic, which is 
illustrated in Marker’s article in this issue. These chains of discursively constructed 
equivalences may well explain the thickening of populist agendas through their saturation 
with diverse meanings and references to multiple events. Yet in the meantime the global 
‘state of exception’ in 2020 has further fragmented the field of populist politics into a 
number of segments with divergent worldviews, from Covid-deniers / Covid-dissidents to 
authoritarian populists like Viktor Orban who used the emergency for ruling by decree. 
This diversity of populist practices complicates academic categorization of the concept, 
yet duly reflects the broad spectrum of political developments that trigger dissimilar and 
even conflicting populist reactions.    
The multiple dimensions of populism as ideology, performance, psychology and 
governance require attention across the spaces in which it is present. This special issue 
expands the analysis of populism into spaces that have been comparatively unexamined 
in the broad field of populism studies. Such expansion helps us reflect on and critically 
examine our understanding of populism as a phenomenon and as a political project. We 
are pleased to have the opportunity to bring these perspectives to the continuing analysis 
of populism around the world. 
